Hazard Assessment

Hazard Identification (HAZID)

Hazard identification (HAZID) involves

  1. All reasonably foreseeable hazards at the major hazard facility (MHF) that may cause a major accident; and
  2. The kinds of major accidents that may occur at the major hazard facility (MHF), the likelihood of a major accident occurring and the likely consequences of a major accident.

The importance of getting the hazard identification right:

Major accidents by their nature are rare events, which may be beyond the experience of many employers. These accidents tend to be low frequency, high consequence events as illustrated in Figure below. However, the circumstances or conditions that could lead to a major accident may already be present, and the risks of such incidents should be proactively identified and managed.

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HAZID must address potentially rare events and situations to ensure the full range of major accidents and their causes.  To achieve this, employers should:

  1. Identify and challenge assumptions and existing norms of design and operation to test whether they may contain weaknesses;
  2. Think beyond the immediate experience at the specific MHF;
  3. Recognize that existing controls and procedures cannot always be guaranteed to work as expected; and
  4. Learn lessons from similar organizations and businesses.

Some significant challenges in carrying out an effective HAZID are:

  1. substantial time is needed to identify all hazards and potential major accidents and to understand the complex circumstances that typify major accidents;
  2. The need for a combination of expertise in HAZID techniques, knowledge of the facility and systematic tools;
  3. The possibility that a combination of different HAZID techniques may be needed, depending on the nature of the facility to ensure that the full range of factors (e.g. human and engineering) is properly considered;
  4. Obtaining information on HAZID from a range of sources and opinions; and
  5. Ensuring objectivity during the HAZID process.

Hazard and Operability (HAZOP)

Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) is a highly structured and detailed technique, developed primarily for application to chemical process systems. A HAZOP can generate a comprehensive understanding of the possible ‘deviations from design intent’ that may occur. However, HAZOP is less suitable for identification of hazards not related to process operations, such as mechanical integrity failures, procedural errors, or external events. HAZOP also tends to identify hazards specific to the section being assessed, while hazards related to the interactions between different sections may not be identified. Therefore, HAZOP may need to be combined with other hazard identification methods, or a modified form of HAZOP used, to overcome these limitations. iFluids has the required subject matter experts who can provide the required assistance.


This is a technique developed to address human factors, procedural errors and ‘man-machine interface’ issues. This type of hazard identification is useful for identifying potential problems relating to procedural failures, human resources, human errors, fault recognition, alarm response, etc.
Human HAZOP can be applied to specific jobs such as lifting operations, moving equipment off-line or to specific working environments such as control rooms. Human HAZOP is particularly useful for looking at areas of a facility where there is a low fault-tolerance, or where human error can easily take a plant out of its safe operating envelope. This technique is quite specialized and iFluids Engineering has the required subject matter experts who can provide the required assistance.

Fault Tree and Event Tree Analysis

Fault Trees describe loss of containment events in terms of the combinations of underlying failures that can cause them, such as a control system upset combined with failure of alarm or shutdown and relief systems. Event trees describe the possible outcomes of a hazardous event, in terms of the failure or success of control measures such as isolation and fire-fighting systems. Fault tree and event tree analysis is time-consuming, and it may not be practicable to use these methods for more than a small number of incidents.iFluids Engineering has the required subject matter experts who can provide the required assistance.

Value Engineering

The main objective of Value Engineering (VE) is to generate and evaluate alternative concepts that would contribute to reduction of the Net Present Value of the PROJECT investment by 5% -10% compared to the base case concept. Secondary objectives for alternative concept are improving operability, maintainability and enhancing HSE performance.

Different Phases in Value Engineering (VE) are as below,

  • Information Phase
  • Function Analysis Phase
  • Creative Phase
  • Evaluation & Development Phase
  • Recommendation Phase

iFluids has extensive expertise to provide project assistance.

Design Review Workshop

The Design Review is an independent and/or peer review undertaken by experienced engineers to conform design suitability and adequacy; maintain technical and design integrity; establish the effectiveness of design processes. During the Design review, detailed engineering documents reviewed. Design review will evaluate the FEED update in detailed engineering documents. HAZID recommendation will also be discussed in the Review Workshop. The design review does not require checking of the full technical detail of specific designs or processes, its purpose is to identify short falls in the design or opportunities for improvements. It provides recommendations for possible action. This technique is quite specialized and iFluids has the required subject matter experts who can provide the required assistance.